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Action and Agency in Early Chinese Thought* 
Chris Fraser (???) 
Abstract: This essay presents a broad, programmatic account of how 
action and agency are conceived of in pre-Qín Chinese thought, along the way 
drawing contrasts with conceptions of action familiar from the Western 
tradition. I propose that instead of a belief-desire model of action, early 
Chinese thinkers apply a “discrimination-and-response” model. Rather than 
emphasizing individual deliberation and decision-making, this model grounds 
agency in people’s brute ability to catch on to and become expert in norm-
governed practices by developing and correcting skills and habits. Agency is 
seen as concerned primarily with abilities, habits, and the skill-like 
performance of familiar patterns of activity. Its ideal expression is reliable, 
virtuoso performance of the dào (way). This model captures certain features of 
real-life agency well, and it calls attention to aspects of agency that tend to be 
downplayed in influential treatments of action in the Western tradition. Thus 
early Chinese texts may provide a intriguing resource that leads us to 
reconsider common assumptions about agency.  
Keywords: action, agency, Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, Mohism 
  I 
This essay presents a broad, programmatic account of how action and 
agency are conceived of in pre-Qín Chinese thought, along the way drawing 
contrasts with conceptions of action familiar from the Western tradition. I also 
comment briefly on how this account bears on the interpretation of early 
Chinese texts and the relation of early Chinese thought to contemporary action 
theory and ethics. Among other points, I will suggest that, as a consequence of 
how features of the classical Chinese conception of action and agency contrast 
with influential Western  
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conceptions, certain apparently commonsensical approaches to interpreting 
Chinese thought and putting it into dialogue with contemporary philosophical 
concerns may be misguided.1 
I will argue that the classical Chinese conception of action and agency is 
significantly different from prominent conceptions rooted in Greek rationalism 
or Enlightenment conceptualism. Such conceptions place deliberation, 
decision-making, and rationality at the heart of agency. They are grounded in 
an argument-like model of practical reasoning epitomized by the practical 
syllogism. Such a model also underlies the traditional belief-desire model of 
action, which is in effect an “argument model” of action.  
 
* This essay is an extensively rewritten version of a talk presented at “Chinese Philosophy in 
Analytical Perspectives,” September 16–17, 2005, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei. 
The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful and insightful comments, many 
of which have been incorporated into the paper. 
1 Throughout the essay, I will use the phrases “early Chinese,” “classical Chinese,” and “pre-
Qín” interchangeably.  
 In comparison with such views, the pre-Qín approach to action and 
agency is markedly less individualistic and less intellectualized.2 Instead of 
individual deliberation and decision-making, it grounds agency in people’s 
brute ability to catch on to and become expert in norm-governed practices by 
developing and correcting their habits and skills. Agency primarily concerns 
abilities, habits, and the skill-like performance of familiar, even routine 
patterns of activity. Its exercise lies less in decision-making than in reliable, 
virtuoso performance of the dào ? (way). As a rough description, we can say 
that pre-Qín thinkers share a “performance model” of action. More precisely, 
as I will explain, their conception of the structure of action can be 
characterized as a “discrimination-and-response” model. This model is in 
many respects plausible, and it calls attention to aspects of agency that tend to 
be downplayed in the treatments of, for instance, Aristotle, Hume, or Kant. 
Hence early Chinese texts may provide a intriguing resource on which to draw 
in contributing to contemporary discourse on action and agency. This is not to 
suggest that the pre-Qín approach is satisfactory or complete as it stands. But 
parts of it capture aspects of real-life agency well, and it may lead us to 
reconsider common assumptions about agency inherited from influential 
Western thinkers.  
This essay seeks to offer only a general, preliminary sketch of distinctive 
features of action and agency in pre-Qín thought and their potential 
implications for comparative philosophy. The goal is to stimulate discussion, 
not to build an ironclad case for the account presented. Further interpretive 
work is needed to fill out the specific conceptions of action and agency in 
different pre-Qín anthologies and  
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to clarify differences of detail between them, some of which the present 
discussion inevitably blurs. Additional study is also required to explore more 
precisely the similarities and differences between early Chinese views and 
important Western approaches, be they those of Aristotle, Hume, or Kant—the 
three dominant historical figures in the philosophy of action—or the rather 
different approaches of, for instance, Nietzsche, Dewey, or Wittgenstein.3 An 
implicit premise of the discussion is that ultimately the account presented here 
must be fleshed out and refined in further, more fine-grained studies. However, 
such studies provide deeper insight when intertwined with a broad picture of 
the overall intellectual orientation and theoretical framework shared by 
thinkers in a particular discourse. Such a picture is the goal of the present 
essay. Its central thesis is that pre-Qín thinkers share a conception of the 
structure of action and the nature of agency that is intriguingly different from 
what we find in influential Western accounts, including those of Aristotle, 
 
2 A partial exception to this rule is the Mencius, which in some passages takes an 
individualistic position on moral improvement, emphasizing self-improvement by using the 
heart to apply one’s inherent moral motivation. For a hypothesis concerning the grounds of 
this individualism, see Dan Robins, The Debate over Human Nature in Warring States China 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 2001), sect. 2.7.  
3 To this list, I should also add “alternative” contemporary treatments such as those of 
Brandom or Searle. See Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994) and John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).  
 Hume, and Kant as well as contemporary thinkers such as Donald Davidson.4 
II 
To help highlight distinctive features of the early Chinese approach to 
action and agency, I will begin by sketching a rough conception of action that 
has been influential in contemporary thought and to varying degrees is shared 
by major figures in the history of Western philosophy of action. For 
convenience, I will call this the “argument model” of action. My sketch of the 
model may lean toward caricature. Nevertheless, as with an actual caricature, I 
suggest it underscores fundamental structural features of its subject.  
A tendency in many influential Western accounts of action, including 
those of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant, has been to focus on the process of 
deciding what to do in a particular situation. Accordingly, action has been 
understood by appeal to the structure of the reasoning involved in deliberating 
about and justifying discrete acts. This structure is in turn modeled on 
paradigms of theoretical reasoning, argument forms such as the syllogism and 
modus ponens.5 The traditional belief-desire  
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model of action is one expression of this focus on decision and reasoning. The 
model descends from Aristotle’s practical syllogism and from Hume’s views 
on reason and motivation.6 It treats individual, discrete actions. These are 
regarded as issuing from intentional states by means of a causal relation that is 
structurally parallel to the relation between the premises and conclusion of a 
practical argument. Actions are explained and justified by appeal to rational, 
inferential relations between premises expressing the content of these states 
and a conclusion representing the action. One of the premises is a cognitive 
premise, which expresses the agent’s belief about the situation. The other is a 
motivational, or conative premise, which expresses the agent’s desire or a 
general pro-attitude. The desire motivates action; the belief guides or triggers 
it. The explanatory focus is on what Davidson calls the “rationalization” of 
actions—on showing how the agent’s reasons rationally justify and guide 
action.  
Agency, on this conception, lies largely in the capacity to grasp and act on 
reasons—in effect, in the ability to produce pieces of practical reasoning and 
respond to them by acting on the conclusion. The exercise of agency is an 
 
4 For Davidson’s views, see his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980).  
5 Aristotle, for instance, expressly assimilates the process of reaching and acting on a 
conclusion in practical reasoning to that of drawing a conclusion in theoretical reasoning. See 
Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin, tr. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 1147a25–31, and 
Movement of Animals, 701a8–9, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes, ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
6 The belief-desire model is often attributed to Hume, on the grounds of his remarks at, e.g., A 
Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., P. H. Nidditch, rev. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1978), pp. 413–18, 455–470. However, an inchoate version of the model can 
probably be found in Aristotle. For instance, the model is suggested by the explication of 
decision at Nicomachean Ethics 1139a32–33: “The origin of an action...is decision, and the 
origin of decision is desire together with reason that aims at some goal.” It is also suggested 
by, for instance, Movement of Animals 701a17–20, in which an agent reasons from “I want a 
covering” to “I must make a coat” (cf. 700b16–17).  
 exercise of the individual’s rational capacities, typically through self-
conscious justification, and thus rational control, of one’s action. The 
paradigm of the exercise of agency is running through a practical syllogism in 
one’s head and then acting on the conclusion.  
In Kantian-inspired approaches to action, the argument model is tied 
closely to notions of freedom and dignity. The grounding of action in practical 
reasoning is part of what makes it free. An agent who merely responds 
automatically to the environment, letting herself be guided by her dispositions, 
is seen as in some sense less free than one who reasons about, justifies, and 
self-consciously chooses her actions. Dignity lies in the ability to choose one’s 
actions autonomously and rationally, rather than having them determined by 
contingent psychological, social, or environmental factors. Genuine agency—
and with it freedom and dignity—lies partly in deciding among alternatives  
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each time we act, and, in certain strands of the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
perhaps even partly in feeling and resisting the temptation to decide badly.  
In contrast to Kantian approaches, the virtue ethics tradition emphasizes 
that action is often guided by dispositions, which are largely the products of 
habituation. To Aristotle, for instance, habituation is how one develops virtues, 
including the master virtue of phronēsis (practical wisdom). Yet Aristotle also 
ties phronēsis closely to decision (prohairesis),7 which he understands as 
desiring to do what deliberation, or rational inference, has shown to be 
required to achieve some end.8 Phronēsis thus includes an essential 
intellectual component. Aristotle does allow that a virtuous person sometimes 
acts immediately, such as in an emergency, when there is no time to deliberate 
before deciding what to do.9 But normally decision requires deliberation, 
which he understands as involving inferences from universal and particular 
premises to conclusions about how to act.10 Despite the important role 
Aristotle assigns to habituation, then, his account of how action originates in 
decision resulting from deliberation corresponds closely to what I have been 
calling an argument model of action.  
No doubt there are situations in which the argument model roughly 
captures what happens when we act. These will generally be cases in which 
we need to make decisions about difficult or unfamiliar courses of action. 
Examples would include one-off, important decisions such as what university 
to attend, what person to marry, or where to go on a long-awaited holiday. 
There are also more routine examples, such as reasoning about what time we 
need to leave home in order to arrive promptly at a meeting.  
But in terms of the exercise of agency in daily life, this model accurately 
describes only a small portion of our activity. Most of what we do every day, 
we do without deliberation or conscious decision. Indeed, much of our activity 
takes place with little or no thought: We simply act. This is especially the case 
with any sort of routine, habitual, or skilled activity, and in fact such activities 
account for the bulk of what we do. Much of the time we simply respond to 
our environment, without paying much attention to, and perhaps without any 
 
7 See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 1105a30–35, 1139a21–22, 1141b10–11, and 1144a13–22.  
8 Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a12, 1139a32–33.  
9 Nicomachean Ethics, 1117a17–22.  
10 Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a22–23, 1147a25–31.  
 real awareness of, alternatives to what we do. This sort of immediate response 
is common even in explicitly intellectual activities, such as delivering a course 
[p. 222] 
lecture or answering students’ questions in class.  
The argument model has other limitations as well. The sorts of 
explanations of action it provides have a specific, limited aim and scope. They 
present agents’ reasons for action: They render an action intelligible or 
justified by showing how it follows rationally from the agent’s psychological 
states or from moral principles. But they do not attempt to explicate the 
processes by which we actually carry out actions—the triggering mechanisms, 
the links between psychological states and physical movements, the practical 
abilities that enable us to execute instructions or to translate the intention to do 
something into performance. The model is thus of limited use in explaining 
habitual, routine actions and the performance of skills. We can use a belief-
desire explanation to model a professional tennis player’s cognitive and 
motivational states and thereby show that her tennis-playing is rational. But 
this is unhelpful in explaining her performance in returning a serve during a 
match. It does not touch on the actual psychophysical processes involving in 
hitting the ball, and no one would claim that the tennis player considers her 
reasons for action before hitting each shot, or even before playing each match. 
(Indeed, she may consciously consider them only a handful of times in her 
career, such as when she contemplates retiring.) An argument or belief-desire 
model also passes over the issue of quality of performance. Faced with the 
same shot in a tennis game, I could have roughly the same beliefs and desires 
as an expert tennis player but miss the shot while she hits it perfectly. 
III 
The link between prevailing models of theoretical reasoning and 
conceptions of action illustrated by the practical syllogism and the belief-
desire model should make us expect that the classical Chinese approach to 
action might be interestingly different from approaches familiar from the 
Western tradition. For the early Chinese conception of reasoning is different in 
structure from either syllogistic reasoning or paradigms of sentential reasoning 
such as modus ponens. It is based on pattern recognition and analogy, not 
logical consequence or formal validity. I will argue that in early Chinese 
thought, as in mainstream Western views, there is a connection between the 
model used to explain reasoning and that used to explain action. But the nature 
of the connection is different. We might say that instead of taking a pre-
existing model of reasoning as a basis for explaining action, early Chinese 
theorists took their conception of action as the basis for their model of 
reasoning.  
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In early Chinese thought, what we think of as logic or reasoning 
corresponds roughly to what early texts call biàn ?, “dialectics,” 
“disputation,” “distinction-drawing,” or “discrimination.” Construed narrowly, 
biàn is a matter of discriminating, with respect to some term, whether a thing 
 under consideration is shì ? (this, right) or fēi ? (not-this, wrong).11 
Formally, the aim of biàn is not to show that some sentence is true, but to 
discriminate what things are or are not of the same kind (lèi ?) and thus 
should be denoted by the same term. When it refers simply to discriminating 
what is shì from fēi, biàn amounts to the counterpart of judgment for early 
Chinese thinkers. But biàn can also refer more broadly to the process of 
considering or debating how to discriminate shì-fēi, in which case it 
corresponds to reasoning or argumentation. The reasoning involved is usually 
analogical: biàn in this sense typically takes the form of citing a precedent, 
analogy, paradigm, or model (fǎ ?) and then explaining why the case at hand 
should be treated similarly or not. The basic structure of such reasoning is 
indicated in Mohist Canon A70: “A model is what something is similar to and 
thereby is so.”12 That is, to support the claim that something is shì (this) with 
respect to some term, we cite a model or exemplar of the kind of thing denoted 
by the term in question. If the object at hand is relevantly similar to the model, 
then the term predicated of it is indeed “so” (rán ?), and the claim stands.  
The claim at stake in biàn is not understood as sentential in form. Rather, 
it is regarded as a term that is predicated of some object, event, or state of 
affairs. Of course, the speech act of predicating a term of something has a 
pragmatic significance comparable to the act of asserting a statement or 
proposition. For instance, the act of discriminating some animal as of the kind 
ox and predicating the term “ox” of it accordingly has a pragmatic significance 
comparable to that of asserting, of that animal, that it is an ox. But early 
Chinese theorists do not explain such speech acts as a matter of asserting a 
sentence or proposition. They regard them as acts in which the speaker 
discriminates something as part of the extension of some term.  
A further important difference from a syllogistic or other sentential model 
of reasoning is that biàn is not regarded as a process of laying out premises 
and drawing a conclusion that is a logical consequence of them. Rather, it is a  
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process of discriminating a thing as “the same as” (tóng ?) or different from 
(yì ?) some kind. It turns on distinguishing whether something falls within 
the extension of a term, not on grasping logical relations between statements 
of a certain form.13 Thus, although the process of biàn often involves 
inferences—in most instances analogical, but occasionally deductive or 
inductive—overall, it is concerned mainly with semantics, not logic.14  
A first step toward seeing the connection between biàn and action is to 
 
11 The graphs biàn ?, typically interpreted as “dialectics” or “disputation,” and biàn ?, 
typically rendered “distinguish” or “discriminate,” share the same phonetic, and classical texts 
often use them interchangeably. They may represent what were originally two senses of a 
single word.  
12 See A. C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong: Chinese 
University Press, 1978), p. 316. 
13 For a detailed discussion of these and other issues in ancient Chinese semantics and logic, 
see my articles on “Mohism,” “Mohist Canons,” and “The School of Names” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu).  
14 Biàn thus pertains mainly to cognition of particulars. In this respect it is similar to the 
situational “perception” (aisthēsis) that Aristotle considers part of phronēsis (Nicomachean 
Ethics 1142a20–30, 1143b5), by which a virtuous person understands morally relevant 
features of particulars and thus can employ appropriate minor premises in deliberation.  
 notice that the practical ability to discriminate kinds also plays a key role in 
early texts’ conception of how models, rules, and instructions guide action. 
Agents are understood to apply such guidelines by discriminating what does or 
does not count as “similar” to them and then acting accordingly. For the 
Mohists, for instance, to discriminate whether a course of conduct is shì or fēi, 
and thus to be performed or avoided, we check whether it “coincides” with fǎ 
(models, which include rules). This checking is understood as analogous to 
discriminating, for example, whether something is square by a perceptual 
comparison of similarity to a setsquare. Clearly, to follow such a guide to 
action correctly, agents must know how to discriminate what counts as 
relevant similarity to the guide. Hence the Analects, the Xúnzǐ, and The Annals 
of Lǚ Bùwéi all emphasize that agents’ ability to follow instructions or rules 
properly depends on social training in discriminating what things fall within 
the extension of the words used in the instructions or rules.15 This issue 
motivates the distinctively Chinese concern with “rectifying names” (zhèng 
míng ??), or training the populace to discriminate the extensions of 
“names”—a category that for pre-Qín thinkers includes all words—in a 
unified, consistent way. Such training will generally be grounded in model 
emulation—in observing and imitating how social superiors discriminate 
things—and is likely to appeal to fǎ (models or paradigms) to guide 
assessments of similarity.  
In a suggestive piece of hyperbole, the Analects (13:3) states that if the 
use of “names” is not rectified, people will be left unable to act at all. A plau- 
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sible explanation is that they will be paralyzed from fear of punishment for 
transgressing laws that they do not understand or that lack any standard 
interpretation. This worry is informative concerning the scope of the action-
guiding norms associated with words. The Analects passage refers to words 
quite generally and to a wide range of activities, from obeying instructions to 
completing tasks to following the norms of ritual propriety and law. The 
doctrine of “rectifying names” thus suggests a picture on which words in 
themselves ultimately take on action-guiding force, even outside the 
immediate context of explicit commands or rules, by becoming associated 
with a network of implicit and explicit norms of conduct.16 Against the 
backdrop of such a network, merely by calling some person or thing “x,” we 
invoke various norms regarding how that person should act (if “x” refers to a 
person) and how we should act toward that person or thing.17  
I call this the “Job Title” theory of language: Words function like job 
 
15 See Analects 13:3, Xúnzǐ Book 22, and John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, tr., The Annals of 
Lǚ Bùwéi (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), sect. 16.8, 17.1.  
16 Chad Hansen’s work in particular has emphasized the importance of the action-guiding 
function of language for early Chinese theorists. See, e.g., his Language and Logic in Ancient 
China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 59. 
17 Perhaps the clearest statement of this view is found in the Zuǒ Zhuàn (Huán Gōng ?? 
2/8/2): “Now names regulate duties; from duties issues propriety (lǐ ); propriety embodies 
governance; and governance rectifies the people. In this way, when governance is complete, 
the people obey. Changing this produces disorder” (?????????????????
????????????????). See Yáng Bójùn ??????????? 
(Beijing: Zhōnghuá, 1981), pp. 92–93.  
 titles associated with roles and protocols.18 If, for instance, in the context of a 
university classroom, I am deemed the “teacher,” that term invokes a 
particular social role and associated norms of conduct. I am supposed to 
present the course content in a coherent, intelligible way, and not sing, dance, 
or chat idly. Similarly, others’ recognition of me as the “teacher”—and of 
themselves as “students”—invokes norms governing how they should act 
toward me. They should raise their hands before asking questions, for instance, 
and should laugh politely at my jokes. We can easily multiply examples. 
Think of all the norms of conduct invoked by telling a young girl to be a 
“lady” or a boy to be a “gentleman.” Moreover, action-guiding norms are 
associated not only with names for social roles, or “jobs,” but with names and 
descriptions of objects. For instance, consider the norms invoked by calling 
something “food” or “dirty.”  
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The mainstream pre-Qín view of our circumstances as agents, I suggest, is 
an extension of the “Job Title” picture. From childhood onward we find 
ourselves embedded in various social roles and contexts that are associated 
with a network of implicit and explicit norms grounded in customs, lǐ  ? 
(ritual propriety), moral guidelines, laws, biological needs, and other factors, 
including our own intentions or commitments (zhì ?).19 Some of these norms 
may be self-imposed, but most probably come with our social circumstances. 
Ruist and Mohist texts indicate that the norms are all-embracing, 
encompassing most areas of life. Much of our activity consists in performing 
social roles in accordance with them. Typically, such performances consist of 
patterns of activity that we internalized long ago and no longer need to think 
about much. Ideally, by the time we are adults, we have already been so 
thoroughly programmed with them that we have robust, reliable dispositions 
to act accordingly. (I will borrow a phrase from Robert Brandom and refer to 
such dispositions as “reliable differential responsive dispositions,” or 
“RDRDs.”) Once we have developed the relevant RDRDs, we can generally 
perform our roles almost automatically. The exception is when we encounter 
exigent circumstances, such as when the standard norms do not seem to apply, 
two or more norms conflict, or it is unclear what sort of action counts as 
complying with the norms.  
The implicit model by which early Chinese thinkers explain how we act 
according to such a network of norms closely parallels their discrimination 
model of judgment and reasoning. We discriminate the circumstances and 
objects in our environment as being of one kind or another, denoted by one 
“name” or another, and then respond to them according to norms associated 
with those kinds and names. In judgment and argumentation, we discriminate 
something as a certain kind of thing and then respond by predicating, or 
 
18 This label was inspired by Donald Munro, who suggested that early Chinese thinkers 
associate names with job descriptions. See The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 24.  
19 Zhì (intention, commitment) for early Chinese thinkers typically refers to the agent’s 
directedness toward some path or end. It is akin to the attitude of setting one’s mind or heart 
on something. I adopt the suggestion that an agent’s zhì is akin to a commitment from Stephen 
Angle, “Sagely Ease and Moral Perception,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 5.1 
(2005), pp. 31–56. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the convergence between 
my understanding of zhì and Angle’s.  
 becoming disposed to predicate, a certain term of it. The difference in the case 
of action concerns the scope of the response. By adopting the attitude that a 
certain term is correctly predicable of something, we invoke the various norms 
and practices associated with that term, which then govern how we act toward 
the thing in question. So beyond discriminating the thing as “x”—“teacher,” 
“student,” “food,” “dirty,” and so forth—we respond to it by acting in an  
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appropriate way. We act that way because our discriminating the thing as an 
“x” triggers RDRDs to respond to it so. Such dispositions are grounded in our 
education, in practices such as lǐ  (ritual propriety), and in our desires (yù ?), 
evaluative attitudes (shì-fēi), and commitments (zhì).20 
In line with their discrimination model of thought and reasoning, then, 
early Chinese thinkers do not explain action by appeal to argument-like 
structures such as the practical syllogism or the belief-desire model. Instead, 
they apply a “discrimination-and-response” model. The structure of action 
comprises a discrimination (biàn) that prompts a norm-governed response 
(yìng ?) to its object.21 A stream of such discriminations and responses in a 
particular context can be regarded as a performance, so we can also think of 
this conception of action as a “performance” conception.22 Given this 
approach to action, early Chinese philosophers do not focus theoretical 
attention on reasoning and decisions, nor on guiding, explaining, or justifying 
individual actions one by one by appeal to pieces of reasoning with roughly 
the form of an argument. Nor does their normative evaluation of actions 
appeal to the notion of rationality. Rather, their concern is with reliable, 
masterful performance of a skill-like flow of activity comprising a succession 
of discriminations and responses.23 Such performance rests primarily on 
abilities, habits, and dispositions, not explicit reasoning. The content of the 
performance is not regarded as a discrete, individual act, but an extended 
pattern or course of activity, denoted  
[p. 228] 
 
20 It is worth noting that in early Chinese thought the object of intention or commitment (zhì) 
is typically a program of study or a path of life, not a single act. Zhì thus often specifically 
involves a commitment to develop certain sorts of RDRDs. (Again, I thank an anonymous 
referee for prompting me to mention this point.) 
21 This model corresponds roughly to the traditional Chinese notion of gǎn yìng ??, or 
“sense and respond,” though in fact this expression was not widely used in the pre-Qín period.  
22 A number of scholars—most prominently, Chad Hansen, but also including A. C. Graham, 
Robert Eno, David Nivison, and David Hall and Roger Ames—have articulated the 
“performance” conception in one respect or another. My aim here is to clarify an interpretive 
insight that I see as at some level shared by many scholars of pre-Qín thought. The 
interpretation presented here was first articulated in my dissertation, Similarity and Standards: 
Language, Cognition, and Action in Chinese and Western Thought (University of Hong Kong, 
1999). It has also been influenced by Dan Robins’s dissertation, The Debate over Human 
Nature in Warring States China.  
23 It is instructive to compare the sorts of dispositions that are the focus of the Chinese model 
to skills, but there is an important difference between them. Both are reliable psychophysical 
capacities for certain types of practical performance. But a skill is something we can choose to 
exercise or not. RDRDs are more automatic: once fully developed, they generally function 
spontaneously, unless in some particular situation they are defeated by other RDRDs. In this 
respect they are more like habits than skills, but ideally they are more robust than habits. 
 by words such as dào (way) and xíng ? (conduct).24 The counterpart in this 
model to a reason for action is the attitude of discriminating something as a 
certain kind of thing. (In early texts, this attitude is typically represented by 
the locution yǐ wéi ??, “to take something as [such-and-such].”) Like the 
activity they trigger, however, such attitudes are not regarded as one-time 
psychological events, but as part of a pattern or path that the agent follows. 
The fundamental normative concept, simultaneously taking the place of 
rationality and general moral principles, is dào (way). Normatively correct 
action lies in discriminations and responses that conform to dào.  
Practical reasoning, on this model, is a matter of considering how to 
discriminate things when we do not immediately see how to do so. The main 
terms for practical reasoning are lǜ ? (forethought) and quán ? (discretion, 
weighing).25 Ancient texts unpack lǜ and quán by appeal to metaphors of 
perceiving and weighing the various features of something in order to 
distinguish it as shì or fēi. So practical reasoning too is understood as a process 
of discrimination. It is seen as an acquired skill, not an innate capacity to grasp 
rational relations between ideas or propositions, as it is for some Western 
thinkers. Most important, it occurs only in exigent circumstances, and it shares 
the same basic structure as the model by which early Chinese theorists explain 
perception and judgment. Indeed, it is in effect a self-conscious, slow-motion 
process of pattern recognition. This point partly explains why some early texts, 
such as the Xúnzǐ, Zhuāngzǐ, and Annals of Lǚ Bùwéi, valorize immediate, 
automatic, flowing action and do not associate agency with running through 
the premises of a practical argument in one’s head. On the pre-Qín model, for 
the virtuoso agent, practical reasoning ultimately reduces to or collapses into 
perception. The highest level of excellence in action is a form of automatic, 
immediate discrimination and response, as when a basketball player sees an 
opening in the opponents’ defense and immediately moves toward it or an 
emergency room doctor sees the source of a patient’s injury and imme- 
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diately begins to treat it.  
Acting according to dào thus need not involve conscious awareness of 
reasons (or rather, their counterpart, kind distinctions). If asked, the expert 
performer can give a justification for his action by identifying the 
discrimination that triggered his response and explaining the similarity that 
prompted him to discriminate things as he did. But in most normal cases, the 
exercise of agency may be a matter of responding to particular situations with 
little or no thought. Conscious deliberation and decision may play only a 
minimal role. This aspect of the discrimination-and-response model, I suggest, 
is of particular interest in understanding the actual exercise of agency in real-
 
24 Obviously, early texts do discuss individual acts at times. But the theoretical focus—the 
primary explanandum or unit of action—is dào, not discrete acts. Arthur Danto makes a 
similar point when he remarks that for pre-Qín thinkers, “The unit of moral discourse is not 
the principles of a moral act but a total moral life.” See “Postscript: Philosophical 
Individualism in Chinese and Western Thought,” in Donald Munro, ed., Individualism and 
Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1985), 
p. 390.  
25 Here I am omitting a third aspect of practical reasoning in early texts, móu ? (planning). 
Móu seems to refer to using the imagination to think through one or more potential courses of 
action in order to decide what to do.  
 life scenarios. For how much of our everyday activity do we really deliberate 
about? Most of us have never deliberated about whether to check a book out of 
the library, as opposed to stealing it, nor whether to stop a child from running 
into a busy street, as opposed to standing by and wishing her luck. Even when 
we do consciously deliberate and decide, often we are making only a routine 
choice within some general course of action about which we do not seriously 
deliberate at all. We may deliberate briefly about what to have for supper, but 
we generally do not deliberate about whether to have supper. As academics, 
we may deliberate about what course to teach or conference to attend, but we 
do not seriously deliberate about whether to teach courses or attend 
conferences in general. These activities are simply part of the dào we follow. 
Indeed, I suspect we rarely even deliberate about what to eat or which 
conference to attend. In much of our activity, we “just see” what to do—
though we may hesitate briefly before doing it, and sometimes, as the pre-Qín 
model of practical reasoning suggests, we need to concentrate and pause for a 
while before we “just see.” It is easy to imagine that, in certain social or 
historical contexts, the scope of habit or mastery could expand to the point that 
virtually all action becomes a matter of automatic discrimination and 
immediate response. Certainly it is easy to understand why Xúnzǐ, for example, 
seems to have thought this was possible.  
IV 
Let me now try to elaborate on the conception of agency that goes hand in 
hand with the discrimination-and-response model. As I suggested above, a 
certain conception of agency familiar from the Western tradition revolves 
largely around the capacity for reasoning, specifically the capacity to reason 
from one’s beliefs and desires or principles in order to decide what to do. Hu- 
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mans are first thinkers, and then, because they are thinkers, agents. By contrast, 
in classical Chinese thought, humans are first and foremost performers, not 
thinkers.26 Agency is related primarily to the capacity for certain sorts of 
performance—the capacity to develop complex dispositions and abilities and 
to excel in exercising them.  
To better grasp the early Chinese conception of agency, we should attend 
to features of skilled activities, such as speaking a language, performing music, 
playing a sport, or carrying out expert work, such as that of a carpenter, waiter, 
doctor, or university lecturer. In such activities, by emulating a limited range 
of models—which for pre-Qín thinkers can include rules and guidelines, such 
as verbal specifications of the content of lǐ (ritual propriety)—we develop 
basic abilities to discriminate and respond to certain paradigmatic situations. 
We then extend and modify these abilities to handle a wider range of cases, 
eventually including novel, uncommon ones. As our abilities advance, we may 
reach the point where we appear to act immediately and automatically, with 
little or no thought or reflection. Yet such action is not a dumb, conditioned 
 
26 Indeed, the dialogue between Róng Fāng ?? and Chénzǐ  ?? in the Zhōubì Suànjīng ?
??? suggests that for early Chinese writers, even an apparently abstract, theoretical 
activity such as mathematics is considered a sort of dào performance. See Qián Bǎocóng ??
?, Suànjīng Shíshū ???? (Beijing: Zhōnghuá, 1963). 
 response. Experts and virtuosos are not automatons. Rather, expert 
performance requires an ability to adjust intelligently to new or changing 
circumstances and to modify or correct one’s RDRDs as the need arises. It 
also involves an degree of inventiveness or creativity. 
The role of practical reasoning in this conception of agency is mainly as a 
response to unusual or challenging circumstances. When the expert or virtuoso 
encounters an unfamiliar or difficult situation, she may pause and deliberate 
about how to proceed.27 But such explicit deliberation is only one aspect of 
agency, and probably a secondary one. More central is the agent’s capacity to 
pursue a long-term moral path, career track, or training program, even if, 
having committed to such a course of action, she never really thinks about it 
much again. This capacity will involve features such as commitment, 
perseverance, resilience, the ability to monitor and correct one’s performance, 
the intelligence to see how to go on in new cases, and the calm needed to 
loosen up and let oneself flow—all of the familiar factors that contribute to 
becoming a skilled performer in any field. The real-time exercise of agency  
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may lie largely in unselfconscious, automatic, yet intelligent discrimination 
and response to particular situations. Exemplars of such automatic yet 
intelligent activity include the Zhuangist character Cook Dīng ??, who 
handles difficulties in his work by slowing down, concentrating, and letting 
his RDRDs guide him, and the Xunzian sage, who responds to changing 
circumstances smoothly and effortlessly.28 
Conceptions of agency that tie it to the agent’s capacity to deliberate and 
decide what to do tend to be highly individualistic. To exercise agency is to 
make up one’s own mind on the basis of reasons one affirms for oneself and 
then to act on one’s decisions. The performance of skills, rituals, and other 
practices is not individualistic in this way. These sorts of activities also 
manifest autonomy, but differently. They do not focus on the decision-making 
processes of the individual agent. In performing a skill, such as speaking a 
language, we must follow norms that do not depend on our decisions. 
Nevertheless, the performance is our own, issuing from our RDRDs. We can 
develop our own style of performance. We can also appeal to other of our 
RDRDs to determine whether to modify or discontinue our performance. 
Within the constraints set by the nature of a practice, there is room for 
autonomy and creativity. Think of a violinist performing a concerto. Every 
movement she will make is scripted and practiced, and the greater her 
virtuosity, the less likely she is to experience any conscious thought about how 
to carry out her performance. Yet clearly the performance is an exercise of 
agency, and it would be perverse to suggest it somehow lacks autonomy or 
 
27 Of course, as I suggested above, the agent can also employ practical reasoning when 
necessary to explain why she responds to situations as she does.  
28 The Xúnzǐ contains several descriptions of the masterful, virtuoso performance of the sage, 
such as this: “He carries out the standards of the hundred kings as easily as distinguishing 
white from black. His responses square with the changes of the age as easily as counting one, 
two. He performs ritual and accords with measure, as at ease with them as he is moving his 
four limbs. His skill in according with the time and establishing achievements is like that of 
nature decreeing the four seasons.” See A Concordance to Xúnzǐ ????, Supplement no. 
22, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1966), 8/59–61.  
 dignity.  
The conscious experience of autonomy in the form of decision-making 
may play little or no role in virtuoso performance. Indeed, the virtuoso may 
sometimes experience her actions as triggered directly and automatically by 
events in the environment, such as the conductor’s cue, rather than by any 
conscious decision of her own. We might even suggest that to become a 
genuine virtuoso, her actions must become automatic, to at least some degree, 
or they will not attain the sort of spontaneity and grace characteristic of 
virtuosity. Nevertheless, these actions are fully hers, since the spontaneous 
triggering of  
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her performance can occur only by virtue of the complex system of RDRDs 
that constitutes her character. Only a sort of residual Cartesianism that ties the 
exercise of agency to conscious, inner ratiocination, rather than the capacity 
for spontaneous intentional movement, would lead us to think of immediate, 
automatic actions as lacking autonomy.  
Clearly, such actions are autonomous in the sense of being under the 
agent’s control. When philosophers discuss autonomy, however, often their 
concern is not this point, but a crucial feature of moral agency: the capacity to 
judge for oneself what is morally right or wrong by appeal to what one 
understands as objective moral norms. Someone might worry that the 
conception of agency I am attributing to early Chinese thinkers denies people 
this capacity. I think we can acknowledge that the Ruist and Mohist dào, like 
those of some major religions, carry a risk of degenerating into something like 
religious-cult programming. There are grounds for concern in Xúnzǐ’s 
conception of moral training, for instance, with its doctrinaire injunction to 
follow authority figures and model ourselves on rituals established by the 
sage-kings.29 But the conception of agency I have been articulating surely 
leaves room for independent, critical thinking. Judging for oneself what is 
right or wrong does not require lifting oneself out of one’s dào or practices to 
examine them from a neutral or God’s-eye standpoint. All it requires is that we 
be capable of conducting our dào-performance as a self-correcting enterprise, 
in which some of our RDRDs can prompt us to critically examine, and perhaps 
revise or eliminate, others.30 Our ability to acquire new, complex RDRDs—to 
learn and improve our skills and habits by modifying our existing network of 
RDRDs—already ensures that we have this capacity. Occasions for such 
examination and revision might arise when different RDRDs prompt 
conflicting responses, forcing us to weigh their relative strengths, assign 
priority to some, and modify or eliminate others. Or they might arise when we 
encounter resistance to our actions—due to novel or changing circumstances 
or the demands of other people—and thus discover that some of our RDRDs 
do not guide us in performing effectively. Again, the likely result is that we 
will modify some  
 
29 Part of what is missing, I suggest, is the sort of liberal, flexible, open-minded practical 
wisdom represented by the Zhuangist concept of míng ? (understanding). 
30 Compare Wilfrid Sellars’s well-known remark that “empirical knowledge, like its 
sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a 
self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.” See 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), sect. 
38.   
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RDRDs on the grounds of others.31  
V 
If dispositions and abilities, rather than reasoning and reasons, stand at the 
center of the early Chinese conception of agency, this will have important 
consequences for how Chinese thinkers understand what we think of as ethics 
and moral psychology, particularly issues concerning motivation and moral 
worth. In the remainder of this essay, I will make a few programmatic remarks 
on these points. I expect some of these to be controversial, since they run 
counter to well-known interpretations of the Mèngzǐ , Mòzǐ, and Xúnzǐ.    
If my interpretation of the early Chinese understanding of agency is 
roughly correct, then for pre-Qín thinkers the main subject matter of what we 
think of as ethics will be how to train people—including oneself and others, 
such as pupils and political subordinates—to perform the dào reliably and well. 
Hence we should not expect early Chinese ethical views to fit neatly into 
categories such as virtue ethics or duty ethics. They will be like virtue theories 
in placing the development and evaluation of character traits near the center of 
ethical thought. But this center will be shared by normative notions such as 
dào (way), lǐ (ritual propriety), and fǎ (models), which play roles analogous to 
those of moral principles.32 These normative guidelines are structurally 
different from abstract, general principles, however, and their application is 
conceived of differently. Unlike general principles, which are typically 
expressed in propositional form, dào refers to a way of doing something, lǐ  to 
standard, ritualized patterns of conduct, and fǎ to models and paradigms. All 
three notions can refer to concrete examples of proper action as well as 
abstract, general norms. They are understood to provide normative guidance 
mainly through processes such as pattern recognition, model emulation, 
habituation, and skill acquisition, rather than through the sort of sentential 
inference captured by a practical syllogism. A further source of ethical 
guidance in pre-Qín thought is implicit norms associ- 
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ated with relational social roles, such as ruler, subject, father, son, and 
brother—the different “parts” agents play in the performance of the social dào. 
These roles are associated with virtues—the most prominent being xiào ? 
(filial devotion), a virtue of morally good children and subordinates. However, 
the content of these virtues is grounded in a conception not merely of 
excellence of character, but of the proper performance of social roles. Hence 
this aspect of early Chinese ethics again distinguishes it from an ethics of 
virtue, as usually understood.  
The performance focus also motivates interest in a normative aspect of 
 
31 I thank an anonymous referee for prompting me to expand this clarification of how we can 
apply some of our network of RDRDs to revise other parts of the network. The underlying 
point is that an RDRD is one way of representing a value or a way of acting. Agents have the 
capacity for critical evaluation and revision of their network of RDRDs because they are able 
to appeal to some values or ways in order to modify or reject others.  
32 Chad Hansen makes a similar point in “Duty and Virtue,” in P. J. Ivanhoe, ed., Chinese 
Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics (Lasalle: Open Court, 1996), pp. 
173–92.   
 action that is seldom considered part of ethics: excellence or virtuosity of 
performance. Early Chinese thinkers are concerned not only with the 
correctness of an agent’s actions, but with how reliably, smoothly, and 
expertly they are performed.33 Indeed, this point is likely to be a key to 
appraisals of character and the moral worth of actions. If pre-Qín thinkers are 
applying a performance model of action, rather than an argument model, they 
are unlikely to evaluate agents by reference to the reasons or motives for 
which they act. Instead, they will evaluate them by reference to the virtuosity 
or excellence of their performance of the dào. Such evaluations will be 
analogous, in some respects, to how we evaluate the performance of a 
champion athlete, a master chef, or an expert surgeon. If our focus is on 
performance, then the reasons for which these virtuosos act are not part of our 
evaluation, or only a peripheral part. What concerns us above all is how 
reliable the virtuoso is in achieving success. I might be able to sink a basket or 
cook a tasty dish occasionally, but my successes are mostly a matter of luck. 
So no matter how good my intentions or reasons are, I do not qualify as a good 
basketball player or cook.  
What is the difference between me and a good player or cook? Mainly it 
lies in the robustness or reliability of our performance across various situations. 
Analogously, on the performance model of action, reliability will be the crux 
of moral worth. A morally good character will be one that incorporates 
genuinely reliable, robust moral responsive dispositions. An agent with such 
RDRDs has in effect internalized the dào, such that following it has become 
part of his character. Morally worthy actions are those that issue from such  
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RDRDs; exercising the appropriate RDRDs is sufficient for moral worth.34 
The question of what reason an agent acted for, or what desire or emotion 
motivated her, will not be seen as central. Hence, despite its prominence in 
influential interpretations of the Mèngzǐ ,35 the issue of whether an agent does 
the right thing for the right reason probably plays only a minor role, if any, in 
early Ruist and Mohist moral psychology and evaluations of moral worth. It is 
relevant mainly insofar as it contributes to an explanation of why a particular 
agent’s outwardly correct action might not be a manifestation of robust 
RDRDs of the right type. Accidentally or temporarily correct action is not 
 
33 This focus may explain why some interpreters, such as David Hall and Roger Ames, have 
suggested that early Chinese thought has an aesthetic orientation. This line of interpretation is 
defensible insofar as quality of performance has a central place in pre-Qín ethics. The sort of 
quality at issue is probably still properly characterized as ethical, but it may well have an 
aesthetic aspect.  
34 I should emphasize that the point of this account is to locate moral worth in features of the 
agent’s character that correspond to the dào, rather than in mere outward conformity to it. An 
agent whose character incorporates appropriate, robust RDRDs is one whose conduct would 
coincide with the dào come what may, even under counterfactual variations in his 
circumstances. By contrast, an agent whose conduct conforms outwardly to the dào but 
springs from unworthy RDRDs can be expected to deviate from the dào in some situations. If 
the agent is motivated purely by self-interest, for instance, he can be expected to diverge from 
the dào when following it conflicts with his interests. (I thank an anonymous referee for 
prompting me to clarify this point.)  
35 See, for example, Táng Jūnyì ????????????????????????
???????????(Taipei: Xuéshēng, 1986), pp. 90–119, and David Nivison, The 
Ways of Confucianism, Bryan W. Van Norden, ed. (La Salle: Open Court, 1996).  
 morally worthy because it does not issue from appropriate RDRDs.36  
Desire plays a less central role in early Chinese ethics and moral 
psychology than it does in approaches informed by motivational Humeanism 
and the belief-desire model.37 According to motivational Humeanism, an agent 
can be motivated to act only if she already has some pre-existing 
psychological state that is captured by the motivational premise—the desire—
in a practical argument. An agent sees a child crawling toward a well or a 
woman drowning and responds by rushing to their aid. A Humean model 
explains this by claiming that perception provides the agent with a belief about 
the situation, which in itself is powerless to prompt action. That he acts is due 
to desire, or a cognate conative or affective state, which combines with the 
belief to move him. This explanation is disputed by motivational judgment 
internalism, which  
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holds instead that an agent can be motivated to act even if she lacks such a 
desire, provided she judges that the action is right. Early Chinese thinkers 
generally come closer to judgment internalism than to motivational 
Humeanism, but in the end I suspect they share neither position.38 For them, 
fundamentally, it may be neither judgment nor desire that drives action, but 
habits and dispositions. The agent who saves the child or woman has an 
RDRD to respond to emergencies by coming to the aid of those in need. The 
RDRD is not a desire, because it is not an intentional state (it has no 
satisfaction conditions, for instance). A Humean might insist that the RDRD is 
at the same time a disposition to generate a desire of the relevant type. But if, 
as I have argued, pre-Qín thinkers do not presuppose a belief-desire model of 
action, then for them positing such a desire yields no additional explanatory 
power beyond simply ascribing to the agent the relevant RDRD. 
Rather than the primary source of motivation, on the discrimination-and-
response model, desire is just one among many sorts of RDRDs that can 
prompt action. Conceptually, desire (yù ?) is typically paired with aversion 
(wù ?) to form an action-guiding distinction akin to shì-fēi. The default 
response to a desire is to pursue its object; that to aversion is to avoid it. But 
desire versus aversion is neither the only nor the fundamental action-guiding 
distinction. Xúnzǐ, for instance, explicitly states that the distinction between 
what we deem “admissible” (kě ?) and “inadmissible” can override desire 
(22/60–62).39 Similarly, both the Mòzǐ and The Annals of Lǚ Bùwéi indicate 
 
36 Parallel points hold of the Mohist conception of knowledge, which assigns no role to 
justification, or the reasons for one’s judgment. To the Mohists, knowledge is the reliable 
disposition to discriminate and name things correctly. If an agent’s dispositions are 
sufficiently reliable, the agent qualifies as knowing. If the agent’s discrimination is correct in 
some cases but not others, she does not count as knowing. The Mohists’ concern is not with 
individual judgments, but with the agent’s overall pattern of discrimination.   
37 This point is due partly to Robins, The Debate over Human Nature in Warring States China.  
38 Most likely, the discriminations that trigger action for Chinese thinkers combine both 
affective or conative and cognitive components. In recent moral philosophy, James Griffin has 
articulated a similar position, arguing that cognitive “recognition” and affective “reaction” are 
inextricably intertwined. See his Value Judgement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
pp. 19–36. 
39 Xúnzǐ thus uses the word “desire” (yù) in a narrow sense, apparently to refer to a brute 
inclination to pursue (qiú ?) some object or end. “Approval,” or the attitude that something is 
 that people can act against their preferences or desires.40 In general, pre-Qín 
thinkers do not treat desire—or other conative or affective states—as a 
necessary con- 
[p. 237] 
dition for moving agents to act.41   
If this interpretation is correct, then there is no particular reason to expect 
that early Chinese theorists will link moral worth to the agent’s having certain 
sorts of desires or affects.42 Nor, in their moral psychology, should we expect 
them to see shaping the agent’s desires or affects as the key to moral education 
or improvement—contrary to well-known interpretations of Mencius43 and 
Xúnzǐ44 and familiar criticisms of the Mohists.45 Indeed, I suggest that the 
project of modifying agents’ desires and affects is not central to Ruist and 
Mohist moral psychology.46 The focus is instead on training the agent’s 
                                                                                                                                
admissible (kě ?), is not regarded as a form of desire, even when it motivates action. 
Similarly, the Mohists do not regard the motivating attitude of deeming something shì (this, 
right) as a form of desire. The conception of desire in these texts thus contrasts with the 
conception in some treatments of action, on which desire refers very broadly to whatever pro-
attitude motivates action. For early Chinese thinkers, there are motivating pro-attitudes that 
are not desires.  
40 See A Concordance to Mòzǐ ????, Supplement no. 21, Harvard-Yenching Institute 
Sinological Index Series (reprint) (Shànghǎi: Shànghǎi Gǔjí, 1986), 47/19–20 and 47/26–28, 
and John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, tr., The Annals of Lǚ Bùwéi (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), sect. 2.2, p. 80.  
41 Two passages in early texts provide potential counterexamples to this generalization. One is 
Mèngzǐ 6A:10, which seems to imply that people inevitably act on their strongest desire. (On 
this passage, see Bryan Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly 32 [1992], pp. 161–84.) If this is indeed the Mencian 
position (it is difficult to tell, since it is not echoed in other Mencian discussions of moral 
psychology), then arguably desires are a key to morally right action for the Mèngzǐ . However, 
the focus of the passage is not to present a general explanation of action, nor does it tie moral 
improvement to modifying one’s desires. Its main point is that, to be morally good, people 
must avoid “losing the original heart” by which they put moral considerations above other 
values. The second passage is The Annals of Lǚ Bùwéi, sect. 19.6, which argues that if people 
lack desires, their ruler will be unable to employ them, because there is no means of 
motivating them.  
42 Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, and Táng,?????, both seem to assume such a 
link.  
43 See, for instance, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2000), p. 94. 
44 The interpretations I have in mind include those of Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of 
Chinese Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 314–15; David Wong, “Xunzi 
on Moral Motivation,” in T. C. Kline III and P. J. Ivanhoe, eds., Virtue, Nature and Moral 
Agency in the Xunzi (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), p. 139; and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian 
Moral Self Cultivation, p. 94. 
45 David Nivison and Kwong-loi Shun, among others, have criticize the Mohists for neglecting 
the issue of how to cultivate agents’ desires or affects. See Nivison, The Ways of 
Confucianism, p. 96, and Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), p. 35. See too Shun’s entry on “Mo Tzu” in Robert Audi, ed., The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 515.  
46 I believe this is the case even in the Mèngzǐ , the text in which affective attitudes play the 
most prominent role. The focus of Mencian moral psychology is not the development of 
motivation, but how to bring into play people’s native capacity to be morally good. The point 
of appeals to affective attitudes, such as sympathy, in the Mèngzǐ  is to establish that all people 
have the ability (néng ?), capacity (cái ?), or latent inclinations (xīn ?, xìng ?) needed to 
be good. The process of moral improvement lies in activating these pre-existing resources and 
 dispositions to discriminate and respond to things in normatively appropriate 
ways.  
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The task of becoming good is framed as one of developing agents’ abilities 
and habits, not cultivating motivation. The keys are education, training, and 
development of traits such as determination, resolve, and resilience. The 
situation of an individual agent seeking moral improvement is like that of a 
cadet who has enrolled at a military academy and at the end of the first, 
difficult week is wondering whether he has what it takes to finish the program. 
He already has dispositions sufficient to have set out on the path, and this is all 
the motivation he needs—at least if we understand motivation as a matter of 
conative and affective states. What he requires now is perseverance—the 
resolve and resilience to follow through. He needs to develop his steadiness 
and resoluteness, not desires or affects.47 To be sure, such a moral 
development program might cause the content of the agent’s desires and 
affects to change. Perhaps, for instance, he will cease to have certain selfish 
desires or become emotionally more sensitive to others’ needs. But such 
changes will be byproducts of the program, not its focus.48  
To illustrate this interpretive claim about desire, consider a prominent 
textual passage that might at first glance seem to provide a counterexample to 
it: the depiction of Confucius at age seventy as able to follow what his heart 
desires without transgressing the norms (Analects 2:4). An outcome of 
Confucius’s lifelong ethical training was that in old age the desires affirmed 
by his heart conformed perfectly to his ethical ideals. But the text does not 
imply that this transformation of his desires was the goal or focus of the 
program of study he commenced at age fifteen, and presumably he was 
already well on his way toward a reliably good character by age thirty, when 
he could stand on his own, or by forty, when he was no longer confused. A 
transformation  
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of his desires was the result of his lifelong ethical development, but desires did 
not provide the initial motivation for it, nor were they the focus of the 
                                                                                                                                
employing them to develop the resolve and dispositions needed for virtuous, correct action. 
(My reading of Mèngzǐ  on these points is indebted to Robins, The Debate over Human Nature 
in Warring States China.)   
47 This sort of steadiness or resoluteness is comparable to what the Mèngzǐ , for instance, calls 
bù dòng xīn ??? (2A:2) and what the Xúnzǐ refers to when it mentions “fixing” or having a 
“robust” intention or commitment (e.g., 2/35–36, 8/18). It may also be what is at stake in 
Analects 6:12, where Confucius criticizes Rǎn Qiú for doubting in advance whether he has the 
strength to follow the dào.  
48 Early thinkers who did emphasize modifying agents’ desires did not advocate shaping their 
content so much as reducing or eliminating what they considered extraneous desires. Their 
concern was less with motivation than with a particular normative conception of the dào. Parts 
of the Dàodéjīng ??? and Zhuāngzǐ maintain that a life conforming to the dào is one of 
few or no desires. The peace activists Sòngzǐ  ?? and Yǐn Wén ?? contended that people’s 
native desires are few and shallow and thus easily satisfied. Along with The Annals of Lǚ 
Bùwéi (sect. 2.3), they distinguished between desires that are qíng ? (“genuine,” in the sense 
of arising from our inherent nature) or not, maintaining that a satisfying, healthy life is one 
that fulfills the “genuine” desires and forgoes the rest. See too Mencius 7B:35, which suggests 
that having few desires is conducive to “nurturing the heart.”  
 development process. His motivation lies in his zhì ? (commitment), not 
desire, and the challenge was not to strengthen or change his motivation but to 
train other aspects of his character.  
If, on the discrimination-and-response model, desires are not necessarily 
what moves us, fundamentally, then what is? I have been arguing that the 
answer is our RDRDs, of which desires are but one kind. But the various 
RDRDs do not operate freely on their own. We can intentionally develop new 
RDRDs, and we can pause to examine the direction in which our RDRDs 
move us or weigh one against another when making a decision. These facts 
suggest that something manages the functioning of RDRDs, thus controlling 
the overall discrimination-and-response system. For most pre-Qín thinkers, 
this something is probably the heart (xīn ?), the executive organ of the body 
and the locus of agency.49 If we accept what Xúnzǐ tells us, however, the heart 
itself functions according to the discrimination-and-response model, guiding 
action by discriminating between what is and is not “admissible” (kě) (22/60–
62). The ability to draw this sort of distinction properly in turn comes from 
knowing the dào (21/32–33).50 The quality of our character and conduct rests 
on our ability to engage in dào-learning, employing the heart to override some 
RDRDs and reinforce others so that we develop robust dispositions to do what 
accords with the dào and avoid what does not.  
 
 
49 One exception to this generalization might be the author of the Zhuāngzǐ “Discourse on 
Evening Things Out,” which parodies the mainstream view that the heart is the “ruler” of the 
other organs. For the later Mohists, zhī ? (the knowing, the intelligence) fills the role played 
by the xīn in other texts.  
50 Mèngzǐ 6A:7 suggests that we have an inborn tendency to find “morality and orderly 
pattern” affectively satisfying: they please our hearts just as delicious foods please our mouths. 
But this and other passages in Mèngzǐ by no means entail that we can develop RDRDs to 
conform to “morality and orderly pattern” without learning and guidance. Indeed, passages 
such as 4A:1 and 6A:20 suggest that following the model set by the sages is crucial.  
